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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, * Case No. 980172-CA 
* 
vs. * 
* 
HENRY THOMAS DeBOOY, * 
Defendant/Appellant. * 
SUPPLEMENTAL OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to the Court's Order, dated June 3,1999, the Appellant 
submits his supplemental brief addressing only the constitutionality of Utah Code 
§ 77-23-104 under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and under 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The Appellant relies on his opening brief for the statement of jurisdiction, 
statement of the case, and statement of facts, supplementing only the statement 
of facts. 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addressing the constitutionality of Utah Code § 77-23-104, the trial court 
refused to "hold that act unconstitutional." [R. 61 at p. 14] In reaching that 
decision, the trial court reasoned, in part, as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
< 
I realize the Defendant's position that under Michigan v. 
Sitts [sic] more is required than the legislative 
determination that the roadblocks that meet the 
standards of the act may be authorized, but.. . the 
legislative determination manifest in the Administrative 
Traffic Checkpoint Act satisfies the same purpose as the 
. . . Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee in the 
Michigan case. In fact, it . . . goes beyond that. The 
committee was composed of people in the executive 
branch, prosecutors and police officers, and the . . . 
Traffic Checkpoint Act was passed by legislators. 
[R. 61 at p. 11-12]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code §77-23-104 cannot pass constitutional muster under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, let alone the constitutional analysis 
under Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution. 
As outlined in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 
S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990), in order to withstand federal constitutional 
scrunity, a roadblock must pass the three-prong balancing test as set forth in 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed2d 357 (1979). The 
roadblock in the instant case fails the second and third prongs of that balancing 
test. 
Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides additional protection 
to the federal law concerning search and seizure of automobiles. Utah case law 
has consistently upheld search and seizure law based on the analysis set forth in 
2 
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Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968). Since Terry 
requires a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, about a particular 
person, prior to the seizure, roadblocks cannot be justified. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: UTAH CODE § 77-23-104 CANNOT WITHSTAND 
CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUNITY UNDER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated. 
In Terry, supra, the United States Supreme Court established a limited 
exception to the general probable cause requirement under the Fourth 
Amendment. In order to justify a particular detention, an officer must be able to 
point to specific articulable factors which, when viewed under an objective 
standard, create a reasonable suspicion that a particular person has committed, 
is committing or is about to commit a crime. Id. , 392 U.S. at 29-30. 
The United States Supreme then established an exception to the Terry 
doctrine, allowing vehicles to be stopped at a roadblock without the requisite 
showing of reasonable suspicion. 
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct 3074, 49 
3 
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LEd.2d 116 (1976), the United States Supreme Court upheld a permanent 
roadblock at which Border Patrol agents stopped vehicles to search for aliens 
illegally entering the country. There, the Court required that such roadblocks be 
permanently located at an international border, or its functional equivalent, and 
that the search be limited to what which is necessary and reasonable to search 
for aliens illegally entering the country. Id. 428 U.S. at 566-67. 
In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, n.26, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 LEd.2d 
460 (1979), the Court suggested that roadblocks conducted for license and 
registration checks could be constitutionally permissible: "Questioning of all 
oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative." Id. at 663. 
Relying on that dicta, courts have allowed roadblocks without a showing of 
reasonable suspicion for the purposes of checking licenses, registration and 
insurance. See generally, United States v. Pilchard, 645 F.2d 854, 856 (10th 
Cir.) cert, denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981). 
In Sitz, supra, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of roadblocks operated as sobriety checkpoints. In reaching this decision, the 
Court relied on the balancing test set forth in Brown, supra,: (1) the gravity of the 
public concerns served by the seizure, (2) the degree to which the seizure 
advances the public interest and (3) the severity of the interference with individual 
liberty: •• •" 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The roadblock in the instant case failed the second and third prongs. With 
respect to the second prong, absolutely no empirical or expert evidence was 
offered to show that the roadblock could or would advance the public interest.1 [R. 
61, at p. 5, 8]. See generally, Brouhard v. Lee, 125 F.3d 656 (8th Cir. 1997) 
("DWI Task Force selected nine checkpoint sites, each having a history of 
alcohol-related accidents and frequent DWI arrests," resulting in "a 19 percent 
overall traffic reduction, and a 10 percent reduction in alcohol related accidents.") 
See also, State v. Kitchen, 808 P.2d 1127, 1129-1131 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991 )(Stressed the expert testimony as to effectiveness of roadblock). 
Another problem lies with the 'committee'. The trial court noted that the 
committee was made up of individuals from the executive branch and approved 
by legislators. This "committee"stands in sharp contrast to the Sitz committee. 
There, the committee was made up of state police forces, local police forces, 
state prosecutors and the University of Michigan Transportation Research 
Institute. The involvement of that research group would certainly neutralize any 
suggestion that the committee was made up primarily by the group (law 
enforcement) that Article 1, Section 14 was designed to curb. 
This is further compounded by the fact that the role assumed by the 
"committee" in the instant case is illusory. Presumably, a committee would look 
'Appellant disregards Trooper Hall's testimony regrading the effectiveness 
of the roadblock because he was involved in the roadblock 
5 
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Unlike Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte, law enforcement officials, in the instant 
case, were not attempting to target an area and curb drunk driving nor were they 
seeking to prevent aliens from illegally crossing an international border. Rather, 
they were simply choosing various locations, at various dates and times, to set up 
roadblocks in the hopes of discovering criminal activity. That they did find 
violations of the law was inevitable. 
This Court and the United States Supreme Court have not, and should not, 
condone such a blatant violation of Fourth Amendment protection. The protection 
against illegal search and seizure is much too precious to forfeit for the 
furtherance of law enforcement objectives, no matter how valuable those 
objectives may be. 
POINT II: THE COURT SHOULD HOLD THE UTAH CODE §77-23-104 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ARTICLE I. SECTION 14 OF 
THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION. 
It is fundamental that when, an officer by means of physical force or by 
show of authority has in some way restrained the liberty of a person, a seizure 
has occurred. Terry, 312 at 19, n.1. Likewise, it is fundamental that the officer 
must justify the seizure by articulating a reasonable suspicion that the person 
seized was, is or is about to be involved in criminal activity. Id. 
The reasonable suspicion requirement set forth in Terry is codified at Utah 
Code §77-7-15. That statute provides: 
7 
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A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing a public offense 
and may demand his name, address and an explanation 
of his actions. 
The protection offered by Terry and by Utah Code § 77-7-15 have been 
relaxed considerably by such the roadblock exception set forth in Martinez-Fuerte 
and Sitz. Utah should retain protection by declining to adopt the exception, 
thereby rejecting generalized notions about the criminal activity of travelers. 
In the concurring opinion of State v. Simms, 808 P.2d 141,146 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991), Justice Orme urged the rejection of the roadblock exception in 
applying the principles of TerAy: 
Terry [citation omitted], uniformly applied by Utah 
courts, is a matter of Utah constitutional law that simply 
may not be balanced away by a branch of our 
government and that is not amenable to a roadblock 
exception. 
In Simms, the appellate court addressed the constitutionality of roadblocks 
under Article 1, Section 14. In holding that roadblock unconstitutional3, the 
appellate court suggested that if a roadblock was authorized by statute, then it 
would "trigger at least some presumption [that the roadblock was] constitutionally 
permissible." Id. at 150. The appellate court further suggested that in the event 
that a roadblock statute was passed, then the legislature would be obligated to 
3The roadblock in that case was held prior to the enactment of Utah Code 
§77-23-104. 
8 
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"perform the Sitz-type balancing function." Id. at n. 17. Justice Orme, however, 
urged the 'solidification' of the 
long-standing constitutional precepts as at the core of 
article I, section 14, than to borrow the troublesome 
"balancing" approach embraced in Sitz, adopt some 
variation of that approach, and beginning the journey 
down that nebulous path. 
Noting this Court's concern in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990) 
where this Court addressed an independent Utah constitutional determination 
under Article I Section 14 for the purpose of simplifying search and seizure rules4, 
Justice Orme discussed search and seizure decisions in the context of Terry: 
Under established Utah decisional law, in the absence 
of any individualized suspicion, only a level one stop is 
permitted. E.g., State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765 . . . 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 
570 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 
87-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A level one stop is a purely 
voluntary encounter. Id. And one does n6t lose the right 
to decline to participate in a level one encounter simply 
because one chooses to drive rather than to walk. See 
State v. Smith, 781 p.2d 879, 881; State v. Johnson, 
771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other 
grounds, 805 P.2d 7612 . . . (Utah 1991). See also, 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 
59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), (persons do not lose the 
protections of the fourth amendment "when they step 
from the sidewalk into their automobiles"); State v. 
4ln Larocco, this Court departed from the confusing federal law and held, that 
under Article I, Section 14 a warrantless automobile search is per sa unconstitutional 
unless supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. Id. at 470. 
9 
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If, as seems clear, the police cannot require every 
pedestrian on a stretch of sidewalk to stop and answer 
police inquiries, I am hard-pressed to see how they can 
stop every car on a stretch of the interstate highway and 
require the driver to answer inquires . . . the only 
roadblock that is sure to pass state constitutional muster 
is one which would qualify as a level-one stop." 
Id. 
That Orme's analysis remains valid is supported by decisions that have 
been issued since Simms and which rely on the reasonable suspicion standard 
set forth in Terry. See generally, State v. Rodriquez-Lopi, 954 P.2d.1290 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998); State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d. 1157 (Utah Gt. App. 1997); State v. 
Patefield, 927 P.2d.655 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); and State v. Bean, 869 P.2d.984 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
That Terry should be applied to any analysis regarding roadblocks is 
further supported by State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1135 (Utah 1994). There, 
this Court abolished the pretext doctrine on the basis that it was superfluous and 
that Terry provided sufficient protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Id. Certainly, if Terry is important enough to justify reversing the 
pretext doctrine, then it should also govern whether a roadblock exception is 
warranted. 
Finally, this Court has never approved of a roving patrol. Yet practically 
speaking that is precisely what a roadblock becomes. Consider Justice 
Rehnquist's dissent in Prouse, when he criticized the decision to allow roadblocks 
10 
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but not random stops as nothing short of "eleva[ting] the adage 'misery loves 
company' to a novel role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." 
CONCLUSION 
This Court is urged to not follow United States Supreme Court in its 
continual relaxation of fourth amendment protection. The crisis facing this state 
and this country does not license the aggrandizement of governmental power in 
lieu of civil liberties. Despite the devastation wrought by crimes in communities 
nationwide, we cannot suspend the precious rights guaranteed by the Constitution 
in an effort to "fight crime". 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court 
reverse the trial court's ruling. 
DATED this 30th day of August, 1999. 
11 
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